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THE MORTGAGE SUBSIDY BOND TAX ACT
OF 1979: AN UNWARRANTED ATTACK ON
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
John J. Keohane*
I. Introduction
Legal archeologists found several of their theories shaken in the
latter half of the 1970's when it was discovered that two concepts,
"impairment of contract" and "state sovereignty" long believed ex-
tinct were found alive and well and living at the Supreme Court.
Apparently unaware of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in National League of Cities v. Usery,' Representative Al Ull-
man, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the United
States House of Representatives, announced in the spring of 1979
the introduction of a bill which again raises the question of state
sovereignty in the context of federal taxing power.2 As introduced,
the bill would amend section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 by repealing the statutory exemption from federal income tax
on the interest paid on bonds or other debt obligations issued by a
state or municipality, or an agency acting on its behalf, for the pur-
pose of providing mortgages for residential housing, so-called
"mortgage subsidy bonds."3
In an announcement accompanying the introduction of the bill,
Representative Ullman stated:
Despite its popularity, the use of tax-exempt revenue bonds to finance
these private investments is poor public policy. The primary goal of Federal
housing policy has been to provide shelter for lower income families. Any
additional Federal resources for housing should be for priority purposes and
be subject to the discipline of the budget process.
Use of these bonds ... is an ineffective way to administer a housing pro-
gram. In fact, it amounts to a subsidized housing program with no exercise
of any judgment or restraint over the use of the funds by either the Adminis-
* Member New York and Florida Bars. B.A. St. Francis College; J.D. Fordham University
School of Law. Mr. Keohane is associated with the firm of Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, New
York City.
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. This is at least the eighth time the question has been raised. See Note, The Taxability
of State and Local Bond Interest By the Federal Government, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 703, 703
n.1 (1969).
3. The legislation is discussed in pt. m. See notes 27-68 infra and accompanying text.
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tration or Congress. There are no controls over the allocation of funds
among programs nor with respect to total budget expenditures. It funds
programs for which Congress has refused to provide through the normal
budget process.'
In this statement the issue is squarely drawn: may a state fund a
program, which carries out a proper public purpose under state
law, through the issuance of debt obligations, the interest on which
is exempt from federal taxation? In other words, is the exemption
from federal taxation merely a statutory grant subject to congres-
sional review or is it a right of the states inherent in the Constitu-
tion? This Article will advocate the latter position and show that
any attempt to tax mortgage subsidy bonds would create an uncon-
stitutional burden on the states' exercise of a proper public pur-
pose.
II. The Public Funding of Housing
Governments in the United States have long used public re-
sources to provide housing for certain individuals, whether deter-
mined by social or economic class. For example, states provided
poor houses in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 5 Addi-
tionally, public resources were extended to effect a public pur-
pose, such as the development of the frontier.'
Government borrowing for housing, however, was not common-
place prior to the Depression.7 For a period thereafter, housing as-
sistance was provided for development of public housing funded
from current tax revenues or intergovernmental borrowing, but-
tressed through real estate tax exemptions.8 Any such borrowings
4. 125 CONG. REc. H2349 (daily ed. April 25, 1979).
5. See, e.g., 1 N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. XX, tit. 1, §§ 43, 44, 71-73 (1827) (repealed 1896).
6. See the Federal Homestead Act, 42 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). (repealed 1976). The Home-
stead Act granted land to induce settlement, cultivation, and the establishment of homes on
public lands, without regard to the grantee's income. Ware v. United States, 154 F. 577 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 588 (1907). See Comment, From Plows to Pliers-Urban Home-
steading in America, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273 (1974).
7. See generally 1 REVISED RECORD OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1938 (1938), particularly the discussion of Int. 145, the forerunner of N.Y. CONST. art.
XVIII. See also NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE REPORTS:
PROBLEMS RELATING TO TAXATION AND FINANCE (1938), particularly the memoranda of I. Rob-
bins, id. at 427-31, and H. Riegelman, id. at 432-37. For a general discussion of revenue
financing see L. MOAK, ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL DEBT (1976).
8. See 2 REVISED RECORD OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1938
1610 (1938), where there is a statement to the effect that there was no State debt in 1901
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were in furtherance of a public purpose of slum eradication or as-
sistance to a broadly defined category of "low income persons";
that is, persons for whom unassisted private enterprise was unable
to provide housing
Public need and public housing policy soon expanded on both a
national and state level. Many of the programs promulgated by the
federal government since 1945 were specifically opened to persons
other than those traditionally considered low income. Indeed, the
National Housing Act of 1949 clearly established as its goal "a
decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family" and sought the construction or rehabilitation of twenty-
six million housing units, only six million of which were to be for
low and moderate income families. 10
when a proposal to issue debt to finance a canal was considered. A Mr. Bennet opposed the
low income housing amendment at the convention because he feared it would "dry up pri-
vate initiative." Id. Senator Wagner noted how the City of Syracuse borrowed from the fed-
eral government and granted tax exemptions to help eradicate slums. Id. at 1639. Former
Governor Smith pointed out that, although the problems of inadequate housing were recog-
nized, the State did not act until 1926 and thereafter acted through the use of eminent
domain and tax exemptions to eradicate or rehabilitate slums. Id. at 1564. See also Murray
v. La Guardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943), where a private insurance company,
acting through a wholly-owned development company, was permitted the benefits of both
eminent domain and tax exemption in acquiring, constructing, and operating the project,
in New York City, currently referred to as Stuyvesant Town.
9. This broad definition of "low income" is hypersensitive to downturns in the economy
which explains, in part, the increased issuance of mortgage revenue bonds in reaction to
inflation occasioned or exacerbated by federal policies. The Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1974 required the development of mixed-income communities to "avoid con-
centrations of low-income and deprived families with serious social problems . ..." 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (1976). In the Housing Act of 1956, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 to 5317
(1976), the federal government expanded the secondary mortgage operations of the Federal
National Mortgage Association in response to many of the stimuli that continue to confront
housing today. As was noted by the House Committee on Banking and Currency:
Your committee fears that the combination of a rising interest rate structure and a
restrictve [sic] monetary policy will act to curtail further the flow of funds into mort-
gage investment. . ..
Your committee is apprehensive over the consequences of a further tightening of the
mortgage money market upon the rate of housing construction. The annual rate of
housing starts has already dropped far below the rate of a year ago.
H. R. REP. No. 2363, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS 4527. See also Comment, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative
Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542 (1958-59); A Home Ownership Aid Program is Planned for
City, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1980, § B, at 3, col. 2 (detailing announcement of program for
reduced down-payment, low-interest mortgages for families with incomes of $15,000 to
$35,000).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1441a(a) (1976). Congress also has stated the intention to "encourage the
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As both the economy and the perceptions of the governmental
role in housing changed, the federal government led the way in pro-
viding housing assistance to persons loosely defined as "low," "low-
moderate," "moderate," and even "upper" income." In the 1960's,
states followed the federal example and created multi-family hous-
ing programs generally funded through the issuance of revenue
bonds.2
In 1970, the State of New York adopted a program of mortgage
assistance, 3 generally patterned on the Federal National Mortgage
Association. The program was designed to pump money into the
single-family mortgage market during periods of tight money and
to aid the construction industry. The program made money availa-
ble without regard to the mortgagor's income. Other states followed
with various single-family mortgage programs."
In 1978, the City of Chicago, operating pursuant to a home rule
provision in the Illinois state constitution," implemented a $100
million mortgage revenue program for single-family housing, pro-
viding assistance to families with incomes of up to $40,000.10 Al-
formation and effective operation of State housing finance agencies and State development
agencies which have authority to finance, to assist in carrying out, or to carry out activities
designed to . . . provide housing and related facilities . . . for persons and families of low,
moderate and middle income. . , ." 42 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (1976).
11. State programs more often originate with the intention of urban renewal, removal of
blight, or avoidance of social problems. See, e.g., Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors
Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699 (Me. 1971); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency, 453 Pa.
329, 309 A.2d 528 (1973); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1977).
Certain programs provide for mixing of income levels for both social and economic reasons,
see, e.g., Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 356
Mass. 202, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969), or disregard income levels and address concern for the
general shortage or inadequacy of housing, see, e.g., New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agency v.
McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 267 A.2d 24 (1970); Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v. Mont-
pelier Nat'l Bank, 128 Vt. 272, 262 A.2d 445 (1970), or economic conditions, see, e.g., West v.
Tennessee Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn. 1974). However, programs found to
lack a "public purpose" have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Goodwin, 597 P.2d
762 (Okla. 1979); Shotts v. Hugh, 551 P.2d 252 (Okla. 1956).
12. The first program for multi-family mortgage revenue bonds is generally considered to
have been created by the New York State Housing Finance Agency.
13. See N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
14. Salsich, Housing Finance Agencies: Instruments of State Housing Policy or Confused
Hybrids, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595 (1978).
15. ILL. CONST. art. VII.
16. The Chicago program has been criticized for its upper-income limit. However, the
First National Bank of Chicago has noted in a report on mortgage revenue bonds that of the
families receiving mortgages "about 10% had incomes below $10,000, 18% had incomes be-
tween $10,000 and $14,999, 26% between $15,000 and $19,999, 20% between $20,000 and
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though not the first city program in the nation, 7 Chicago became
the model for many similar local financings. Since then, mortgage
bonds have been issued by various state and local governments em-
ploying a variety of instrumentalities including government depart-
ments,'8 public corporations, 9 municipalities operating pursuant to
home rule"0 or specific legislative grants,2' public trusts," and not-
for-profit corporations.23
During 1978, local governments issued more than $550 million in
single-family mortgage subsidy bonds. 4 In the first nine months of
1979, 106 offerings were made totalling more than $4.2 billion. 5
Offerings in Arkansas, Louisiana, California, and West Virginia ac-
counted for approximately half the number of issues .2
III. A Summary of H.R. 5741
House Resolution 5741 [the "Bill"] 27 would amend section 103 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, by adding a new section, 103A,
$24,999, 15% between $25,000 and $29,999 and 11% had incomes above $30,000." FIRST NA-
TIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, FIRST CHICAGO WORLD REPORT: RESTRICTING MORTGAGE REVENUE
BONDS 11-12 (Nov./Dec. 1979).
17. Apparently the City of Minneapolis was the first. See Freilich, Rushing & Noland,
Review of Local Government Law, Municipal Bonds: The Tax-Exempt Issue to Finance Sin-
gle Family Homes, 11 URB. LAW. 547, 583 n.238 (1979) [hereinafter cited as URBAN IAWYER].
18. E.g., the Maryland Community Development Administration. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 266DD-l(b) (1978).
19. E.g., the State of New York Mortgage Agency. See N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2403
(McKinney Supp. 1979).
20. E.g., Chicago, Ill., see ILL. CONST. art. VII; various municipalities in Kansas, see
KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5.
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-5204 (Supp. 1979).
22. See, e.g., LA. RzD. STAT. ANN. § 9:2341 (West Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 176 (West Supp. 1979).
23. E.g., the Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act. See TEx. REy. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 12691-7, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
24. See URBAN LAWYER, supra note 17, at 583 ("approximately $550 million"); Tax-Free
Housing Bonds Cost More Than They Are Worth, FORTUNE, July 2, 1979, at 86 ("more than
$600 million").
25. Tax-Exempt Housing Issues Top $3 Billion in Quarter, 250 DAILY BOND BUYER 293
(1979).
26. Id.
27. The Bill is entitled "the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1979," H.R. 5741, 96th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1979). It was accompanied by a committee report, H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The Bill was sponsored by Representative Al Ullman and cospon-
sored by Representatives Conable, Corman, and Moore. An earlier version of the Bill was
introduced in April, 1979. "The Mortgage Subsidy and Interest Exclusion Tax Act of 1979,"
H.R. 3712, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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entitled "Mortgage Subsidy Bonds." Section 103 currently reads in
pertinent part: "Gross income does not include interest on-(1) the
obligations of a State, a Territory, or a political subdivision of any
of the foregoing or of the District of Columbia .... "218 Subject to
certain. exceptions, the Bill excludes mortgage subsidy bonds from
section 103(a).29
The Bill defines a mortgage subsidy bond as "any obligation
which is issued as part of an issue a significant portion of the pro-
ceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly for mortgages on
owner-occupied residences."0 From this definition, the Bill ex-
cludes two types of bonds: "qualified mortgage bonds,"'" and
"qualified veterans' mortgage bonds.""2 The Bill sets up ten crite-
ria for a "qualified" mortgage bond.33 However, under a sunset pro-
vision, qualified mortgage bonds would not be exempt two years
after the Bill's enactment.3
A. The Ten Criteria
The Bill creates an elaborate statutory scheme defining what
constitutes a qualified mortgage bond. The ten criteria can be sum-
marized as:
1. All proceeds of the mortgage bond issue, exclusive of
reserves and issuance costs, must be used to finance owner-
occupied residences;35
28. I.R.C. § 103(a). Two types of obligations, industrial revenue bonds and arbitrage
bonds, were specifically excluded from the exemption in § 103(a), see §§ 103(b) & 103(c), by
prior amendments, see Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (1968) (industrial
revenue bonds); Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601, 83 Stat. 487, 656-57 (1969) (arbitrage bonds).
H.R. 5741 further amends the restrictions on industrial revenue bonds. See H.R. 5741, § 3.
These bonds are discussed briefly in pt. IV. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
29. H.R. 5741 sec. 2, § 103A(a), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (§ 103A).
30. § 103A(b)(1).
31. § 103A(b)(2)(A).
32. § 103A(b)(2)(B). This Article focuses on the more general mortgage bonds. It should
be noted however that the Bill requires that veterans' bonds be secured by the general obli-
gation of the issuing state. § 103A(c)(3)(B). For a general description and discussion of these
bonds see § 103A(c)(3) and the committee report, H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
46 (1979).
33. See §§ 103A(c)(2)(A) & (c)(2)(A)(ii). The ten criteria are discussed immediately
below.
34. § 103A(c)(1)(B).
35. § 103A(c)(2)(A)(i). Reserves generally are established equivalent to one year's maxi-
mum debt service on the bonds and one percent of the amount of the mortgages, to provide
additional security. The largest portion of the issuance cost is the underwriter's discount,
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2. The property mortgaged must be the principal residence
of the mortgagor and be located within the jurisdiction of au-
thority issuing the bond; 36
3. With certain exceptions,37 the mortgagor may not have
had an ownership interest in a residence for the three years
prior to the time the mortgage is signed; 38
4. The purchase price of the residence is limited; 9
5. Three-quarters of the financing provided by the issue must
be used for mortgages where the down payment is small,
usually five-percent; 0
6. The median family income of the mortgagor may not ex-
ceed 115 percent of the median family income for the area in
which the residence is purchased,4 and at least half of the is-
sue's proceeds must be used to finance residences purchased
by mortgagors whose median family income is not greater
than ninety percent of the median family income for the area
in which the residence is purchased;' 2
7. No issuing authority may issue in one year more than five
percent of the average annual amount of all single family
mortgages written within the issuing authority's jurisdiction
over the preceding three years.43 However, a minimum of
but costs include printing, legal, and administrative expenses. Approximately 83% of the
proceeds are available for making mortgages.
36. § 103A(d)(1).
37. The exceptions are for (i) residences in "target areas," defined in § 103A(m); (ii)
qualified home improvements, defined in § 103A(n)(6); and (iii) qualified rehabilitation
loans, defined in § 103A(n)(7).
38. § 103A(e).
39. § 103A(f). The purchase price may not exceed 80% of the "average area purchase
price," defined in § 103A(f)(2), or, if the residence is located in a targeted area, 110% of the
average area purchase price, § 103A(f)(4).
40. § 103A(g). The down payment minimum does not apply to qualified home improve-
ment or rehabilitation loans. § 103A(g)(1). Larger down payments are permitted in some
circumstances. See § 103A(g)(3).
41. § 103A(h)(1)(B).
42. § 103A(h)(1)(A). Again, exceptions are made for mortgages by purchasers of resi-
dences in targeted areas. See § 103A(h)(3). "Family income" and "medium family income"
are to be defined by regulations to be issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and insofar as
they are consistent with the purposes of the Bill, are to be consistent with regulations pro-
mulgated under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937. § 103A(h)(2). The Housing
Act definitions are contained in 24 C.F.R. § 880 (1979).
43. § 103A(i)(2).
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$50,000,000 may be issued in a particular state each year;4
8. At least twenty percent of the proceeds of the issue must
be used to finance residences in targeted areas for at least one
year after the financing is first made available to targeted ar-
eas. 5 However, the issue need not account for more than forty
percent of the total mortgages written in a targeted area;48
9. The rate of interest on the mortgage may not be more
than one percentage point over the yield on the bond." Addi-
tionally, any gain realized by the issuing authority, either
through arbitrage or investment, must be used to reduce the
mortgagors' cost of financing; 8 and,
10. The appropriate state agency, after reviewing the issue's
official statement, must give an opinion that the issue meets
the criteria set forth in 7. and 8., above,49 the bonds must be
in registered, rather than bearer, form,5" more than one lender
must be involved,5' and, with certain exceptions, the mort-
44. § 103A(i)(3). However, the state may provide its own formula for allocating the per-
centage or dollar limitation among issuing authorities. § 103A(i)(5).
45. § 103A(j)(1).
46. § 103A(j)(2).
47. § 103A(k)(2)(A). The Bill defines the manner in which the effective rate of interest is
to be calculated. See § 103A(k)(2)(B).
48. § 103A(k)(4); see also § 103A(k)(3).
49. § 103A(l)(1)(A). A favorable opinion is given if the agency does not act within thirty
days. § 103A(l)(1)(B). In states with constitutionally established broad home rule traditions,
Illinois for example, see ILL. CONST. art. VII, compliance with this provision could give rise
to state interference with local government operations.
50. §103A(l)(2). Proponents of this provision assert that it is necessary to prevent evasion
of estate and gift taxes and to permit enforcement of the restriction of the Bill if a particular
bond issue ceases to be a qualified issue. See H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1979). What is unstated in the Bill is that neither purpose can be effected unless federal
agencies are given access to the records of the particular bond registrar. This, however, could
raise charges of invasion of privacy.
The concept that a particular bond issue may cease to be qualified in the future could
have a serious adverse effect on the issuance of any such bond; perhaps foreclosing issuance
altogether. Under existing statutory law, determination of the tax exemption is based on
reaso'nable expectations at the time of issuance. The expectation arises from the wording of
the statute regarding the purpose for which the proceeds of the bond "are to be used." I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(2)(A). This code section is repeated in part of the Bill, § 103A(c)(2)(A)(i), but not
in § 103A(c)(2)(A)(ii), which requires the program to comply with various prospective crite-
ria. The Bill does provide a good faith defense, but failure to comply must be "due to inad-
vertent error after taking reasonable steps to comply." § 103A(c)(2)(C)(ii). It is unlikely that
bond purchasers will buy bonds which may become taxable absent some "deep pocket" to
pay the penalty for taxation.
51. § 103A(l)(3).
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gages must be new rather than assumed.52
As can be seen, the Bill does not make the interest paid on mort-
gage bonds non-exempt per se although that is the practical effect.
Rather, it makes any bond issue that does not follow the Bill's
enunciation of federal housing policy non-exempt and thus more
expensive for the issuing authority." By so doing, the Bill coerces
states to aid housing only when it coincides with particular federal
policy.
B. Particular Exemptions
Certain bond issues are exempted from the Bill's coverage. This
gives rise to interesting political considerations. As noted above,54
general obligation bonds for veterans' housing are exempted. How-
ever, only three states have such a program:55 Oregon, Wisconsin,"
and California. The first two states are represented by Represen-
tatives Ullman and Reuss respectively, the cosponsors of the bill
52. § 103A(l)(4)(A). The exceptions are contained in §§ 103A(l)(4)(B) & (1)(5).
53. The effect of the loss of the exemption on housing provided by municipal financing
has been considered by Congress. See S. REP. No. 2140, 76th Cong., 3d Seas. (1940). A mi-
nority report attacked the proposal to tax state securities as an attempt to impose federal
control, id. at 1-3, and asserted that the loss of the exemption would add materially to the
cost of low-income housing and thus prevent attaining the goals of the National Low Cost
Housing Act. Id. at 21. The Senate, by a vote of 44 to 30, adopted the minority report. 86
CONG. REC. 18621 (1940).
The economic effect of the "inefficient subsidy" occasioned by the current exemption gen-
erally is used as a basis for curtailing the exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22 (1979). However, the economic analysis and assumptions underlying this position
recently have been criticized strongly. See M. MussA & R. KORMENDI, THE TAXATION OF Mu-
NnIPAL BONDS: AN ECONOMic APPRAISAL (1978). The authors, economists at the University of
Chicago, criticize certain of the federal government studies for ignoring, among other things,
the effect of inflation.
[W]e find that for inflation rates of greater than 2 percent the "efficiency ratio" of the
exemption is more than 90 percent. In other words, municipal governments enjoy
more than ninety cents of benefit for each dollar of tax revenues lost by the federal
government. Moreover, at inflation rates of 5 to 6 percent, the efficiency ratio of the
exemption rises to 97 percent. In comparison with other federal subsidy programs,
this is a very high efficiency ratio, particularly for a program that provides assistance
in such a desirable form, without strings and constraints on municipal governments.
Id. at 9-10.
54. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
55. H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 19-20 (1979).
56. However, Wisconsin has reached its authorized debt limit on general obligation vet-
erans' bonds and has had to implement a revenue bond program. The realization of this may
explain why Representative Reuss failed to cosponsor the Bill.
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which originated the exception. 7
In like manner, section 4 of the Bill exempts issues on which cer-
tain "official actions" have been taken. 8 However, the Bill ignores
state law provisions regarding the proper official to take particular
actions." Section 4 also contains exceptions based upon specific
criteria which limit their application to localities in Alaska, 0 non-
charter cities in California,' the State of New York Mortgage
Agency, 2 certain public trusts in Oklahoma,63 localities in Tennes-
see, 6' Atlanta, Georgia, 5 Alton, Illinois," localities in Texas, 7 and
the New York City Housing Development Corporation.
IV. The Constitutional Limitation
In elementary, government it is taught that the republic was
formed pursuant to a constitution drafted by representatives of the
states and subsequently ratified by the states. In that Constitution
certain powers were ceded to the federal government and others
were reserved to the states or the people.6" The concept of federal
instrumentalities' sovereign immunity from taxation by the states
57. See H.R. 3712, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979).
58. H.R. 5741, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(1) (1979).
59. In certain charter cities in Tennessee, for example, the governmental powers are exer-
cised by a strong mayor. However, debt is actually issued by the council of the city. Hence,
under a strict construction of the Bill, which apparently is favored by the committee staff,
see H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1979), actions taken by such mayor, which
would otherwise constitute "official action," would not comply. Senator Sasser of Tennessee,
after reporting on a study conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations which, while finding a lack of substantial abuse in mortgage revenue bond pro-
grams, recommended a "capping" of issuance on a state by state basis, observed that the
county government of Shelby County, Tennessee, was unable to issue bonds because of the
uncertainty of their status under the Bill. See 126 CONG. REc. S1537-39 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1980). The experience to date in the House and remarks like those of Senator Sasser increase
the likelihood that if any bill were passed it would resemble a Christmas tree.
60. H.R. 5741, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(4) (1979);
61. Id. § 4(b)(5). This reference may also apply to certain localities in Minnesota and
Maine.
62. Id. § 4(c)(4).
63. Id. § 4(d)(1).
64. Id. § 4(d)(2).
65. Id. § 4(d)(3).
66. Id. § 4(d)(4).
67. Id. § 4(d)(5).
68. Id. § 4(1).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
118-19 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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was recognized early.70 It is the complementary doctrine whereby a
state or its instrumentality is immune from federal taxation which
is of concern here.7 While reciprocal sovereign immunity has gone
in and out of favor,7" with the effect of continually narrowing the
doctrine, recent court opinions have reaffirmed its place as a con-
stitutional limitation on federal taxing power.73
A. The Early Cases
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,' the Supreme Court
noted that the federal government has an unlimited power of taxa-
tion with one exception, it could not tax imports, and two qualifi-
cations, direct taxes must be imposed by rule of apportionment,
and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. The Court was divided
on whether the tax on the net profits of the defendant was a direct
tax not apportioned among the states in accordance with article 1,
section 2 of the Constitution.75 However, the entire Court agreed
that the attempt to tax the interest on state obligations was be-
yond the competence of Congress."
As the States cannot tax the powers, the operations, or the property of the
United States, nor the means which they employ to carry their powers into
execution, so it has been held that the United States have no power under
the Constitution to tax either the instrumentalities or the property of the
70. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The ability of the state
to tax a federal instrumentality was questioned in a logical fashion by reference to certain
political propositions, to wit: (i) the power to create implies the power to preserve; (ii) a
power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is both hostile to and incompatible with the
powers to create and to preserve; and (iii) where such hostility exists the power which is
supreme must control. Id. at 426.
71. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). There is no express limitation in
the Constitution on the federal taxing power. Rather, one has been implied to ensure "the
continued existence of the states as government entities." Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.
405, 414 (1938). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court implic-
itly recognized this principle as a constitutional imperative. Id. at 843 n.14.
72. Compare Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) with
New York v. United States, 326 U.S 572 (1946), Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939) and Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
73. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also notes 131-
33 infra and accompanying text.
74. 157 U.S 429 (1895).
75. Id. at 586.
76. Id. at 584-87; id. at 601-08 (Field, J., concurring); id. at 652 (White, Harlan, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 653 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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state .... 1
[A tax on the interest of state and municipal obligations] would operate on
the power to borrow before it is exercised, and would have a sensible influ-
ence on the contract, and that the tax in question is a tax on the power of
the states and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and consequently
repugnant to the Constitution."
Upon rehearing, the Court further stated that a tax on the re-
ceipts from municipal bonds could not be sustained because it is
a direct tax "on the power of the States, and on their instrumen-
talities to borrow money, and consequently repugnant to theConstitution.""9
In response to Pollock, the sixteenth amendment was enacted. 0
The amendment granted Congress the "power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment."'" While the amendment appears straightforward and
absolute, it simply abrogated one of the qualifications on the fed-
eral taxing power noted above; it did not extend the power to new
subjects.2
77. Id. at 584. The Court stated: "A municipal corporation is the representative of the
State and one of the instrumentalities of the State government. It was long ago determined
that the property and revenues of municipal corporations are not subjects of federal taxa-
tion." Id.
78. Id. at 586.
79. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 630 (1895).
80. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, REPORT OF THE TAXING
PowER oF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS 61-62 (Comm. Print 1937). See also Hale v.
State Bd., 302 U.S. 95, 107 (1937); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 259-62 (1920).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
82. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1920), overruled on other grounds in O'Malley v.
Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
[Tihe genesis and words of the [sixteenth] Amendment unite in showing that it does
not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes all occa-
sion otherwise existing for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on in-
come, whether derived from one source or another. And we have so held in other
cases.
253 U.S. at 261-62 (footnotes omitted); accord, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206
(1920). "As repeatedly held, [the sixteenth amendment] did not extend the taxing power to
new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for unappor-
tionment among the States of taxes laid on income." Id.
Evans and Eisner are consistent with the legislative history accompanying the sixteenth
amendment. Senator Brown, the legislative sponsor of the amendment, stated:
The amendment does not alter or modify the relation today existing between the
States and the Federal Government. That relation will remain the same under the
amendment as it is today without the amendment. It is conceded by all that the
Government cannot under the present Constitution tax state securities or state
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B. A Turning Point
Subsequent to World War I, the Supreme Court began to limit
the broad immunity from federal taxation theretofore enjoyed by
the states. Notably, however, there has been no decision upholding
a direct federal income tax on the interest of state or local bonds.
In National Life Insurance Co. v. United States,13 the Supreme
Court considered a provision of the 1921 federal tax law which,
while permitting insurance companies to exclude policy premiums
from gross income, required that interest from state and local obli-
gations be included in gross income. The interest received from
such obligations was deductible but another deduction, equal to
four percent of the company's legal reserve, was diminished by the
interest deducted. The effect of this law was that the tax paid was
the same as if all the interest income were taxable. The Court re-
fused to uphold this method of taxing interest on municipal bonds.
The Court held: "One may not be subjected to greater burdens
upon his taxable property solely because he owns something that is
free. No device or form of words can deprive him of the exemption
for which he has l awfully contracted." 4
Wilicuts v. Bunn5 is not inconsistent with the earlier case of Na-
tional Life. Here, the Court held proper a tax on the capital gain
realized on the sale of a municipal bond. Pollock was cited with
approval for the proposition that the interest on "obligations of a
State or of its political subdivisions [is] exempt from federal taxa-
tion."" A tax on the profits derived from the sale of such bonds was
distinguished on the grounds that it would not impose a burden on
the borrowing power of the state. "No facts as to the actual conse-
instrumentalities.
45 CONG. REc. 225-46 (1910). Many officials and writers argued that the language of the
sixteenth amendment giving Congress the power to tax from whatever source derived
granted the federal government the power to tax interest on state and local bonds. See Tax-
Exempt Salaries: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 43-47 (1939) (statement of J. Morris, Ass't Attorney General). See also STAFF OF THE JT.
COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 76TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., REPORT ON POWER OF CON-
GRESS TO TAX THE INTEREST FROM STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES (1939). Notwithstanding these
contrary views, the position argued herein was accepted by the Supreme Court in the cases
cited above.
83. 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
84. Id. at 519.
85. 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
86. Id. at 226.
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quences are brought to our attention, either by the record or by
argument, showing that the inclusion in the federal tax of profits
on sales of state and municipal bonds costs any appreciable bur-
den on the States' borrowing power."8
This distinction between a direct versus an indirect burden is
consistent with the Court's earlier decisions in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co.8" and Greiner v. Lewellyn" and with its subsequent decision in
Denman v. Slayton ° The issue before the Court in Flint was the
constitutionality of the federal corporate excise tax of 1909. The
corporation tax law imposed a tax on the privilege of carrying on or
doing business by a corporation measured by the corporation's net
income from all sources, including interest from state and munici-
pal bonds. The Court accepted Congress' declaration that the tax
was an excise tax.' The standard for reviewing such a tax is not
the sixteenth amendment but, rather, article 1, section 8, clause 1,
of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to impose
"Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises."'" Because this clause con-
tains no limitation except one of uniformity, the Supreme Court
held that Congress had the power to include in the measure of the
tax the income from tax-exempt securities, although such income
could not be taxed directly. The Court stated:
It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the sover-
eign has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an
exercise of a franchise or privilege, it is no objection that the measure of
taxation is found in the income produced in part from property which of
itself considered is non-taxable."
87. Id. at 230.
88. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
89. 258 U.S. 384 (1922).
90. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
91. 220 U.S. at 145. Accord, Speckles Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
92. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 provides: "The Congress shall have the Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Com-
mon Defense and general welfare of the United States, but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."
93. 220 U.S. at 165. This distinction between income and excise taxes was recognized
long before the Pollock decisions. See Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
611 (1867); Society for Say. v.. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1867). Similarly, the distinc-
tion has been upheld in cases subsequent to Pollock. See Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115
(1900).
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In Greiner v. Lewellyn,"4 the Supreme Court summarily rejected
the argument that an estate tax based on the net value of the es-
tate, including interest received on municipal bonds of a political
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was unconsti-
tutional. The estate tax was described as the antithesis of a direct
tax.".The Court held that the tax due may be calculated without
regard to the character of the property transferred."
Less than two months after Wilicuts was decided, the Supreme
Court, in Denman v. Slayton,97 upheld a provision in the Revenue
Act of 1921 which disallowed a deduction from gross income for the
interest received on a municipal bond where those bonds had been
purchased with borrowed funds of which interest payments thereon
were deductible. The Court upheld the provision and distin-
guished National Life:
The circumstances disclosed in National Life Ins. Co. v. United States were
radically different from those now presented, and the doctrine upon which
that cause turned does not control the present one. The respondent here was
not in effect required to pay more upon his taxable receipts than was de-
manded of others who enjoyed like incomes solely because he was the recipi-
ent of interest from tax-free securities-a result which we found would have
followed enforcement of the literal provisions of [the Act] .... The mani-
fest purpose of the exception in paragraph 2, § 214(a), was to prevent the
escape from taxation of income properly subject thereto by the purchase of
exempt securities with borrowed money.
Under the theory of respondent, "A," with an income of $10,000 arising
from non-exempt securities, by the simple expedient of purchasing exempt
ones with borrowed funds and paying $10,000 interest thereon, would escape
all taxation upon receipts from both sources. It was proper to make provi-
sion to prevent such a possibility. The classification complained of is not
arbitrary, makes no improper discrimination, does not result in defeating
any guaranteed exemption, and was within the power of Congress."
The most recent case to discuss the issue of state immunity from
federal taxation is United States v. Atlas Life Insurance Co.9 This
case involved a requirement of the Life Insurance Company Income
Tax Act of 1959 that insurance companies pro-rate exempt interest
94. 258 U.S. 384 (1922).
95. Id. at 387.
96. Id.
97. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
98. Id. at 519-20.
99. 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
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between the company and its policy holders. Respondent argued
that the law effectively taxed exempt interest. The Court dis-
agreed, finding that the effect of the law was to equalize the tax
burden between taxpayers with exempt and non-exempt securities
and taxpayers whose gross income was derived only from taxable
sources."" The rule of Pollock and National Life was not
undermined." '
It is clear, therefore, that both by decision and dicta the Su-
preme Court has upheld the principle that the federal government
may not directly tax the interest received from state and local
bonds. It follows that the amendments to section 103 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code passed in 1968 and 1969 which limit the tax ex-
emption on industrial development bonds'02 and arbitrage bonds 03
are unconstitutional. No case raising this issue has been reported.04
Whatever the reasons for the conspicuous absence of discussion on
the subject,'10 it is wrong to infer that the passage of such amend-
100. Id. at 243-44. The Court noted that, according to a letter submitted by the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, the enactment did not intend to place' a tax on exempt interest, but
that an exception had been added to the bill in case of a contrary ruling. Id. at 241 n.12.
101. For a similar conclusion reached through different reasoning see Comment, Tax-
Exempt State and Local Bonds: Form of Intergovernmental Immunity and Form of Inter-
governmental Obligation, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 757 (1972).
102. I.R.C. § 103(b).
103. Id. § 103(c).
104. But cf. Kirkpatrick v. United States, 605 F.2d 1160 (10th Cir. 1979). In this case,
the court held that bonds issued by a tax-exempt hospital to finance construction were in-
dustrial development bonds within the meaning of I.R.C. § 103(b) and, therefore, the inter-
est paid on such bonds was subject to federal income tax. Notably, neither the plaintiff nor
the court discussed the issue of the statute's constitutionality.
105. In the discussion accompanying the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266-68, no mention is made of the constitutional
issue. See S. REP. No. 1014, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
.CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2354; CONF. REP. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2373, 2379. Similarly, in the legislative material
accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the discussion of taxable "arbitrage" bonds cov-
ers some twenty pages, but the constitutional question is limited to a few paragraphs, signif-
icant of which is the following:
Although the present legal basis for the exemption of interest on State and local
obligations from the Federal income tax is found only in section 103(a) of the code,
there is a body of opinion to the effect that it would be unconstitutional for the Fed-
eral Government to tax interest from State and local obligations without the consent
of the issuing governments. It also is maintained that the exemption is part of a fed-
eral system of government under which the Federal Government does not infringe on
the powers of the State and local governments. This position has been disputed, and
many authorities have indicated that the Federal Government does have a constitu-
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ments negates the argument made herein. 06
C. Federal Taxation of Other State Activities
It is unclear to what extent the cases involving federal taxation
of state activities other than borrowing for a public purpose are rel-
evant to the issue of taxing the state's borrowing power. In the
Senate hearings on the Public Salary Act of 1939, Senator Brown
quoted David Wood, who he called the "foremost authority on mu-
nicipal bonds in the United States,"'0 7 as saying:
While the courts, both before and since the ratification of the sixteenth
amendment, have recognized the limitations which the system of dual sover-
eignty has imposed upon the taxing powers of the State and of the Federal
Government, they have also been aware that these limitations must not be
extended too far or they likewise would impair, if not destroy, the very sys-
tem, the existence of which they were necessary to preserve. Both the State
tional right to tax the interest on State and local securities.
H.R. REP. No. 413 pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1825-26. In the committee report accompanying the Bill as
reported from the House and Means Committee, the question is not even raised. In-
deed, the committee report asserts the position maintained by the Treasury that the tax
exemption is a congressional grant:
Under present law (Code sec. 103), interest on State and local governmental bonds
generally is exempt from Federal Income taxation .... However, in order for the
interest on a State or local government bond to qualify for tax exemption, the bond
must satisfy certain restrictions placed on the use of its proceeds. One statutory re-
striction applies to industrial revenue bonds. Another restriction is the arbitrage
provision.
H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
In contrast, when the Internal Revenue Code was being revised in the late 1930's, there
was extensive discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding Congress' ability to tax
government salaries and securities. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 112, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-10
(1939); STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 76TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
POWER OF CONGRESS TO TAX THE INTEREST FROM STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES (1939); STAFF OF
THE JT. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 74TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE TAXING POWER OF
THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS (1936).
Moreover, when the Internal Revenue Code was revised again in 1954, Congress indicated
that the [new] section 103 did not represent a substantive change from the 1939 act. HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, H. R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A32 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4025, 4168.
106. See Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). "It is obviously correct that no
one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even
when that span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it." Id. at
678.
107. Public Salaries Tax Act of 1939: Hearings on H.R. 3790 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1939).
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and the Federal Government must raise revenue, and if the principle of im-
munity were carried too far, the reciprocal immunities would seriously im-
pair the ability of each sovereign to raise revenue. The courts have, there-
fore, refused to apply the doctrine to taxes, which are not levied directly
upon the exercise of a sovereign power, but which affect it only remotely.
This distinction is brought out by two cases like Helvering against Gerhardt
and cases involving the taxation of bonds of governmental agencies, or the
income derived therefrom.'"
In Helvering v. Gerhardt,' where a federal income tax on em-
ployees of a bi-state agency was sustained, the Court expressly dis-
tinguished the situation presented from one where the tax is im-
posed on a private investor of state bonds."0 Similarly, in
Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate,' where it was held that the
interest on bonds of the Port Authority of New York was exempt
from federal taxation, the court stated that the decision in Helver-
ing had no bearing on the issue before them there."'
It has been argued that the decision in Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe"' rejected this distinction between the taxation of the
state's borrowing power and the taxation of other state activities.
In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a line of earlier cases"4
and held that salaries of state officials were not immune from fed-
eral taxation."' In a memorandum prepared by the Justice Depart-
ment in 1940,"1 it was argued that Graves, in specifically overrul-
ing its decision in Collector v. Day, impliedly overruled its decision
in Pollock. The memorandum stated that Graves laid "the basis
for a denial in the future of tax immunity to the income derived
from state and municipal bonds.""' 7 The Supreme Court did state
in Graves that "[tihe theory, which once won a qualified approval
that a tax on the income is legally or economically a tax on its
source, is no longer tenable . ." and intimated that a tax on in-
108. Id.
109, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
110, Id. at 417.
111. 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945).
112. 144 F.2d at 1003.
113. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
114. The Court specifically overruled New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401
(1937) and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). See 306 U.S. at 486-87.
115. 306 U.S. at 487.
116. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT BONDHOLDERS (1940)
(prepared for Sen. Spec. Comm. on Taxation of Governmental Securities and Salaries).
117. Id. at 3.
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come derived from salary is no different than one on "some other
form of compensation.""'  Although consistent with the political
mood of the times," ' this is, at best, too expansive a reading of
Graves. Properly, this language is dicta as it was unnecessary to
decide this point to resolve the question presented. More revealing,
however, is the fact that five years later, when the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit was presented with an opportunity to
limit the scope of state immunity from federal taxation in Sham-
berg,2 0 it refused to do so and ignored the dicta from Graves. In
addition, the Court in Atlas Life Insurance made no use of Graves
in its decision.12'
Notwithstanding this clear distinction between a federal taxation
on the state's borrowing power and one on other state activities,
some commentators have used those decisions on the latter issue as
support for the argument that state immunity from federal taxa-
tion largely has been undercut. 2  It is the position .of this author,
118. Id.
119. President Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to Congress on January 19, 1939, urg-
ing changes in the tax law. In the message Roosevelt stated:
In my message of April 25, 1938, I urged that the time had come when the Congress
should exercise its constitutional power to tax income from whatever source derived. I
urged that the time had come when private income should not be exempt either from
Federal or State income tax simply because such private income is derived as interest
from Federal, State, or municipal obligations, or because it is received as compensa-
tion for services rendered to the Federal, State, or municipal governments.
A fair and effective progressive income tax and a huge perpetual reserve of tax-
exempt bonds could not exist side by side. ....
The tax immunities heretofore accorded to private income derived from Govern-
ment securities or Government employment are not inexorable requirements of the
Constitution, but are the result of judicial decision. I repeat that it is not unreason-
able to hope that judicial decision would permit the elimination of these immunities.
Reprinted in Tax Exempt Salaries: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939).
120. 144 F.2d 998, 1003 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945). See notes 111 &
112 supra and accompanying text.
121. 382 U.S. 233 (1965). See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Comment, Tax-Exempt State and Local Bonds: Form of Intergovernmen-
tal Immunity and Form of Intergovernmental Obligation, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 757, 763-77
(1972); Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested Approach
to the Doctrine and its Application to State and Municipal Bond Interest, 15 VILL. L. REv.
414, 421-36 (1970); Note, The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest by the Federal
Government, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 703, 704-09 (1969). See also STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON INTERNAL
REVENUE.TAXATION, 76TH CONG., IST. SESS., POWER OF CONGRESS TO TAX THE INTEREST FROM
STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES (1939).
More recently, however, in the Senate debates on the Danforth Amendment making the
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however, that the case law in this area will not support taxing
mortgage subsidy bonds, as the Bill attempts to do.
In Helvering v. Gerhardt,' the Court held that activities not
"essential to the preservation of state governments" could be taxed
even though collected from the state treasury. 2' The opinion ex-
plicitly states that the borrowing power is essential to the preserva-
tion of state government. 12 Helvering effectively was reaffirmed in
New York v. United States,16 where the Court held that the sale
by a state of mineral water was subject to the federal taxing
power.'1 In both Helvering and New York the Court refused to find
such state-run, profit-making activities beyond the competence of
the federal taxing power.
In contradistinction, the mortgage loan program which the Bill
restricts is not a profit-making enterprise.'28 The proceeds acquired
by state and local debt issued under these programs are used most
commonly to subsidize housing for low and low-middle income
"Wildfall Profit Tax" applicable to oil from state owned lands, Senator Russell Long, Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Finance, and others argued that such a tax would imply
that the federal government could tax the interest on municipal bonds and therefore would
be unconstitutional. See 125 CONG. Rc. S18461-66 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1979); id. at S18651-55
(daily ed. Dec. 15, 1979). Senator Long reviewed New York v. United States and declared it
provided three criteria for Congress to tax a state, viz.: "One, income from State-owned
lands is immune from Federal taxation. Two, discrimination against a State will not be
permitted; that is unconstitutional. Three, the Federal tax cannot interfere with the sover-
eign functions of the State government being taxed." Id. at S18655. See also id. at S18661
(remarks of Sen. Tower) & 126 id. at S585 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1980) (remarks of Sens. Wallop
& Armstrong) (objecting to attempt by Rep. Ullman to append the Bill to the Windfall
Profits Tax bill in the conference committee). However, Senator Long and his colleagues
are no doubt mindful that New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (sale of state
owned mineral water), Allen v. Regents of the Univ. System, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) (ad-
mission charge for athletic events), and United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936)
(state run railroad) may be read to support the proposition that business activities of a state
are not beyond the reach of the federal taxing or commerce regulatory power even if the
revenues derived are utilized to effect a public purpose. A distinction should be made, how-
ever, that mortgage revenue bonds directly effect a public purpose. Consistency on the con-
stitutional argument would lead one to assume that the followers of Senator Long's position
would oppose the Bill.
123. 304 U.S. 404 (1938).
124. Id. at 419.
125. Id. at 417.
126. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
127. However, see the vigorous dissents of Justices Douglas and Black, id. at 590, 593-98
(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting), and the interpretation of this case by Senator Long, note
122 supra. See also South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S 437 (1905).
128. See pt. II supra.
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families.'29 Therefore, neither New York nor Gerhardt stand as pre-
cedent for taxing the bonds at issue herein.3 0
The case of National League of Cities v. Usery 3' also supports
this position. There, amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
which included state and local fire and police officials within its
scope were challenged as a violation of the tenth amendment. This
amendment states that "It]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'' The Court
held that the amendments as applied to the states were an uncon-
stitutional infringement on state sovereignty. Those activities
which are "integral government functions" may not be regulated
by the Congress. 33
V. Conclusion
While it is clear that not every activity in which a state engages
would fall within National League's prohibition, it is beyond doubt
that the borrowing power is an integral government function ex-
129. Id.
130. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), is not apposite. In that case, the
Court held that a state-run railroad was not beyond the scope of the federal commerce
clause. Although National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), distinguishes the
situation in Ccifornia from federal regulation of local fire and police departments, National
League's reasoning undermines the holding in California. See 426 U.S. at 850-51.
131. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
133. 426 U.S. at 852. See generally Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The
Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115, 1117 nn.13-15
& accompanying text.
The Department of Labor, in accordance with the Court's decision, has promulgated regu-
lations for administration determinations of what constitutes a "traditional governmental
activity" exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 44 Fed. Reg. 75,628-30 (1979) (to
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 775). The Department has added to the Court's determination
that a railroad is not a traditional function the following functions: off-track betting corpora-
tions; local mass transit systems; generation and distribution of electric power; provision of
residential and commercial telephone and telegraphic communication; production and sale of
organic fertilizer as a by-product of sewage processing; production, cultivation, growing or
harvesting of agricultural commodities for sale to consumers; and, repair and maintenance
of boats and marine engines for the general public. Id. at 75,630. The Department has found
the operations of libraries and museums to be traditional. Id.
In Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979), city airport employees
were found to serve an integral government function and therefore beyond the scope of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The court noted that there are four elements common to integral
government functions. Those are: 1) the function benefits the community as a whole and is
"available to the public at little or no direct costs"; 2) the function is undertaken "for the
purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain;" 3) the function is principally
provided by government; and 4) government is "particularly suited" to perform the function.
Id. at 1037.
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empt from federal regulation. 134 In addition, the purpose for which
proceeds from the mortgage subsidy bonds are put serves such a
function. States are empowered to provide for the general health
and welfare of their citizens. 135 The state, in providing certain hous-
ing, depending on the economic climate at the time, is performing
a public purpose3 ' and exercising no less an integral government
function than it does in providing police or fire protection. Where
the state, through its representatives, chooses to subsidize an activ-
ity for the protection and enhancement of its citizens, the federal
government should not,3 7 and may not, interfere with that deci-
134. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
135. Such power may be granted by a "general welfare" clause in the state constitution
or by specific authorization. Compare, e.g., COLO. CONST. pream.; ILL. CoNsT..pream.; ME.
CONST. pream.; MASS. CONST. pream.; OHIO CONST. pream.; OKLA. CONST. pream.; S.D.
CONST. pream.; Wis. CONST. pream. (general welfare) with N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §§ 8(1) &
(2), 14, 18, 19; art. VIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XVIII (specific authorization).
136. It is an established rule that appropriations or expenditures of public money, and
the issuance of indebtedness therefore, by states and their agencies must be for a public
purpose. See, e.g., Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (1978); McClean
v. City of Boston, 327 Mass. 118, 97 N.E.2d 542 (1951); Hays v. City of Kalamazoo, 316
Mich. 443, 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947); Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876). See also
Sigal, The Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the Local Finance Article: A Critical
Analysis, 8 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 29, 34 (1979-80). Housing has been held to be a public pur-
pose in numerous jurisdictions: Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Assoc., 416 P.2d 245, 251-
53 (Alaska 1966); Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositor's Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 705 (Me.
1971); Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 356 Mass.
202, 211-14, 249 N.E.2d 599, 606-07 (1969); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297
Minn. 155, 166-72, 210 N.W.2d 298, 305-08 (1973); New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agency v.
McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 420-22, 267 A.2d 24, 27-28 (1970), Martin v. North Carolina Hous.
Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 44-45, 175 S.E.2d 665, 677 (1970); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin.
Agency, 453 Pa. 329, 337-38, 309 A.2d 528, 533-34 (1973); West v. Tennessee Hous. Dev.
Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Tenn. 1974); Vermont Home Mortgage Credit Agency v.
Montpelier Nat'l Bank, 128 Vt. 272, 276-78, 262 A.2d 445, 448-49 (1970); State ex rel. W. Va.
Hous. Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver, 171 S.E.2d 545, 550-51 (W. Va. 1969); State ex rel. Warren
v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 413-23, 208 N.W.2d 780, 795-800 (1973). Whether a state activ-
ity fulfills a proper public purpose is a determination to be made by the state legislatures
and courts. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1920). It is interesting to note that au-
thorization for federal housing programs has been found in the United States Constitution's
general welfare clause contained in the preamble. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976).
137. Recent legislation considered by Congress shows more concern for the implications
of National League than does the Bill. For example, in the legislative history accompanying
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 it is stated that certain changes in the municipal bank-
ruptcy law are based on the decision, viz.:
The Court enunciated a stronger policy of Federalism and States' rights than had
been stated since the first Municipal Bankruptcy Act was held unconstitutional in
1936. In deference to developing ideas of Federalism, this bill takes greater care to
insure that there is no interference in the political or governmental functions of a
municipality that is proceeding under Chapter 9, or of the State in its power to con-
trol its municipalities.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 263 (1978), reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6221. Similarly, the House-Senate Conference on the Windfall Oil Profits
Tax bill exempted from the bill's provisions oil production of a state and local government if
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sion.'35 The Bill does interfere with such state and local govern-
ment choice and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
As was noted above,' 3 a case considering a constitutional chal-
lenge to the arbitrage or industrial development bond regulations
has not been found. However, given the current disposition of the
Court in light of National League, the time may be ripe for a test,
the result of which, hopefully, will be to end the perennial at-
tempts to unconstitutionally interfere with the states.
Postscript
On March 26, 1980, the Bill passed the House by a vote of 238 to
178. 126 Cong. Rec. H2237 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980). It is ex-
pected that the Bill will be rewritten in conference.
the proceeds are used for any public purpose. Crude Oil Windfall Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-223, sec. 101, §§ 4986, 4991(b)(1), 4994(a)(1) (to be codified at I.R.C. §§ 4986,
4991(b)(1), 4994(a)(1)). See also note 122 supra. States provide a laboratory for
experiments in social progress and their activities should not be hindered by the federal
government. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579-80 (1946); see also id. at 591-
92 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. It is conceded that under this analysis the industrial development bond regulations
arguably are constitutional as they limit state debt to traditional government purposes. See
note 102 infra and accompanying text. But see Newberry v. Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d
629 (1962); Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957); Gaylord v. Beckett, 378
Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460 (1966); City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 287 Minn. 357, 178 N.W.2d
594 (1970); Opinion of Justices, 112 N.H. 42, 288 A.2d 697 (1972); Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 507 P.2d 1074 (1973); Mayor & Alderman of Fayetteville v.
Wilson, 212 Tenn. 55, 367 S.W.2d 772 (1963); State v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d
784 (1973) (all holding industrial revenue bonds fulfill a public purpose).
139. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.

